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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
are no real distinctions to be drawn, under either federal or state
constitutional analysis, when dealing with the right to freedom of
the press, particularly public and media access to courtroom
proceedings.
City of New York v. Dana384
(decided April 16, 1995)
The defendants, Raymond Dana and 236 W. 54th St. Corp.,
owners and operators of an adult movie theater known as "The
New David Cinema," opposed a proceeding that would grant the
City of New York a preliminary injunction to close the cinema.
Defendant's argued that the injunction would violate the New
York State Constitution's guarantee of freedom of expression.385
Defendants urged that article I, section 8, of the New York State
Constitution as construed by the New York Court of Appeals in
Arcara v. Cloud Books,386 precluded granting the preliminary
384. 165 Misc. 2d 409, 627 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1995).
385. Id. at 414, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 276. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This
section states in relevant part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press." Id. The defendants did not invoke their right to free speech
under the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment states that: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ... ." Id.
386. 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986). In
Arcara, the New York Court of Appeals held that "when government
regulation designed to carry out a legitimate and important State objective
would incidentally burden free expression, the government's action cannot be
sustained unless the State can prove that it is no broader than needed to achieve
its purpose." Id. at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847. The Arcara
court stated that "[if] other sanctions, such as arresting the offenders, or
injunctive relief prove unavailing," then the state's burden under the standard
would be met. Id. at 559, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847. The
important state interest in Arcara was the abatement of public nuisances (the
premises were used to engage in prostitution). Id. at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 494,
510 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
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injunction. 387 The defendants in Dana argued solely on the basis
of the New York State Constitution and made no claim as to any
protection offered them under the Federal Constitution. 388 The
defendants relied only on New York constitutional grounds
because the New York Court of Appeals decision in Arcara had
been previously reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court389 where
the federal constitutional standard was articulated prior to
reversing and remanding the case back to the New York Court of
Appeals. 390 On remand, the court of appeals affirmed its
previous decision based on their right to exercise independent
judgment on issues involving fundamental rights in free speech
matters under the New York Constitution.391
In Dana, the Supreme Court, New York County, held that
defendants' freedom of expression was not violated because the
city had met its burden under the "least restrictive means test,"
finding that no other course of state action could halt the risky
sexual activity that was taking place within the cinema without
having to close it.392
Defendant 236 W. 54th St. Corp. conducted business as The
New David Cinema in premises located at 236 West 54th Street
where defendant owned and operated a movie theater.393 On or
about April 3, 1995, plaintiffs named and served defendant with
an amended summons and complaint. 394 In support of this
proceeding, plaintiffs had submitted affidavits of two inspectors
from New York City's Department of Health. 395 The inspectors'
affidavits documented that high risk sexual activity was occurring
at the cinema regularly. 396 Between March 7, 1995, and March
20, 1995, the inspectors noted at least 45 incidents of sexual
387. Dana, 165 Misc. 2d at 414, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
388. Id. at 414-15, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
389. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
390. Id. at 707.
391. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 557, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
392. Dana, 165 Misc. 2d at 415, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 276-77.
393. Id. at 410, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
394. Id. at 411-12, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
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activity engaged in by cinema patrons. 3 97 These inspections came
after two letters of warning from the Department of Health dated
August 10, 1993 and February 10, 1995.398 Prior to the March,
1995 inspections, the Associate Commissioner of Health wrote to
the cinema on August 10, 1993, requesting the cinema's
cooperation with the city's efforts to thwart the spread of
AIDS.399 In a reply letter, the cinema stated that a program of
periodic theater inspections as well as posted conspicuous signage
had been instituted to halt such conduct and an employee would
eject perpetrators if necessary.4 00
Despite this exchange of correspondence, investigators
continued to observe sexual activity at the cinema. 40 1 On
February 10, 1995, Deputy Health Commissioner Dr. Benjamin
A. Mojica, wrote to the defendants. 402 Dr. Mojica enclosed a
copy of section 24-2 of the State Sanitary Code proscribing
establishments as defined in the State Sanitary Code. 403 The
doctor's letter further notified the defendant that recent
inspections had revealed the frequent occurrence of prohibited
sexual activities at the cinema and that inspections of the cinema
would be conducted on a continuing basis. 404
Although defendants did not dispute receiving the letters, there
was, according to the inspectors, some reduction in sexual
activity at the cinema after the February 10, 1995 letter was
sent.405 However, this proved to be temporary.40 6 Between
March 7, 1995 and March 20, 1995 the two inspectors observed
at least 45 incidents of sexual activity engaged in by patrons of
the cinema.40 7 Subsequently, plaintiffs commenced this action. 40 8
397. Id.
398. Id. at 412, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
399. Id. at 412, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
400. Id. at 412-13, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
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Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and continuation of
the temporary closing order previously granted. 409
Plaintiffs maintained that the cinema constituted a public
nuisance which should be temporarily shut down pursuant to
New York City Administrative Code section 7-707(a), pending a
permanent injunction. 4 10 Plaintiffs sought this relief based on the
investigation by the two inspectors who discovered numerous acts
of high risk sexual activity as defined by the New York State
Sanitary Code, occurring during their twenty-two visits to the
cinema over a two month period. 4 11
Prior to a move to close the cinema, the Department of Health
issued two warning letters two years apart. 412 The second
warning letter indicated that the cinema would be subject to an
action to close if it failed to comply with the Department of
Health's requests. 4 13 The court concluded that the Department of
Health, by sending these warning letters, attempted to limit the
unlawful sexual activity without interfering with the defendant's
motion picture business. 4 14
Furthermore, the court found that there did not exist a plan of
state action that would attenuate the nuisance without closing the
cinema.4 15 Due to the fact that the cinema had already tried
various preventative measures such as monitors, signs and
409. Id. at 410, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
410. Id. at 410, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The New York City Administrative
Code defines "nuisance" as follows: "The word 'nuisance' shall be held to
embrace public nuisance, as known at common law or in equity jurisprudence;
whatever is dangerous to human life or detrimental to health .... All such
nuisances are hereby declared illegal." Id. at 411, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 274
(citation omitted).
411. Id. at 410, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The New York State Public Health
Council concluded that two of the most serious risk behaviors that are
associated with the transmission of the HIV virus are fellatio and anal
intercourse. Id. at 411, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The State Sanitary Code
declared that "facilities where such activities take place 'shall constitute a
threat to the public health' and are prohibited, and may be closed by local
health officers as constituting a 'public nuisance.'" Id. (citations omitted).
412. Id. at 415, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 415, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
415. Id. at 416, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
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pamphlets, and that these efforts had not prevented the prohibited
activity, the court found that any system that required the cinema
to police itself was not a viable alternative. 416 Considering that a
serious health risk was at issue in the case, the court concluded
the only effective method to prevent the illicit sexual conduct at
the cinema was to close it.4 17
The court relied upon the standard set forth in Arcara, in order
to determine the extent of protection offered a defendant under
the New York State Constitution. 418 As stated previously, the
Arcara court held that the New York State Constitution goes
further than the Federal Constitution in protecting individuals
from incidental burdens on free expression.4 19
In Arcara, the respondents operated a store where they sold
adult books and showed movies which were sexually explicit but
not obscene.420 As in Dana, customers used the premises for
illegal sexual acts.421 The store owner in Arcara was aware of
the activities but did nothing to prevent them. 422 The District
Attorney became aware of the acts which were observed by an
investigator from his office, but had not arrested the offenders
nor had them criminally prosecuted. 423 Furthermore, the
prosecutor had not applied for an injunction to prevent future
illegal acts from occurring on the premises. 424 Instead, the
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 414-15, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
419. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 557, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
The Arcara court stated:
We, of course, are bound by Supreme Court decisions defining and
limiting Federal constitutional rights but in determining the scope and
effect of the guarantees of fundamental rights of the individual in the
Constitution of the State of New York, this court is bound to exercise its
independent judgment and is not bound by a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States limiting the scope of similar guarantees in the
Constitution of the United States.
Id. (citations omitted).
420. Id. at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 493, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 493-94, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
424. Id. at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
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prosecutor moved to close the bookstore for a year under article
23, title II of the Public Health Law.425 Respondents alleged that
a closure order would impermissibly interfere with their state
constitutional rights of free expression. 426
The United States Supreme Court in Arcara considered the
application of the O'Brien427 balancing test. 428 This four part test
had been applied exclusively to cases involving the governmental
regulation of conduct that was deemed to have an expressive
element.42 9 Under this test, a governmental regulation aimed at
non-speech activity which has an incidental effect on speech is
justifiable if: (1) the regulation is "within the constitutional
power of the [g]overnment," (2) if the regulation furthers "an
important or substantial government interest," (3) if the
government interest is "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression" and (4) the incidental restriction on First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is necessary to [further] that interest"
(the "least restrictive means" test).430
The Supreme Court found that the sexual activity that occurred
in Arcara contained no expressive element whatsoever4 31 and
that the imposition of the closure order had nothing to do with
425. Id.
426. Id. at 555-56, 503 N.E.2d at 493, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 845. Framing the
issue, the Arcara court stated:
It would appear, without more, that closing the store would be equally
disruptive or ineffective with respect to the activities of both the
bookstore and its customers. The primary question is whether it
implicates the bookseller's constitutional rights of free expression so as
to require a balancing of the competing interests.
Id. at 556-57, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
427. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In determining that the
activity involved in Arcara was not expressive and, therefore, not protected
under O'Brien, the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he defendant in O'Brien had, as
respondents here do not, at least the semblance of expressive activity in his
claim that the otherwise unlawful burning of a draft card was to 'carry a
message' of the actor's opposition to the draft." Arcara, 478 U.S. at 702.
428. Id. at 703.
429. Id. at 707.
430. Id. at 703.
431. Id. at 705.
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any expressive conduct at all. 432 Therefore, the Court concluded,
the four part O'Brien test should not be applied.433 The Court
concluded that the bookstore's First Amendment rights were not
affected because the object of the order was the illegal conduct of
the bookstore's customers and not the bookselling itself.434 Thus,
under the Federal Constitution, the "least restrictive means" test
only applies when government action was triggered by and
directly aimed at curtailing "conduct that has an expressive
element." 435
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the New
York Court of Appeals in Arcara decided that greater protection
was due the bookseller under the New York State Constitution's
guarantee of freedom of expression.436 The court of appeals
found that the crucial factor in determining if a state action
affects freedom of expression is the "impact of that action on the
protected activity" (in this case, bookselling) and "not the nature
of the activity which prompted the government to act" (the sexual
conduct).437 The test then, the court of appeals concluded,
focused not on the non-expressive conduct aimed at by the
regulation, but rather the protected expressive conduct that is
incidentally hit and affected by the regulation.438
The burden, therefore, fell on the state to prove that in seeking
to close the store, "it had chosen a course that was no broader
432. Id. at 705-06 n.2.
433. Id. at 707.
434. Id. According to the Court, "[t]he legislation providing the closure
sanction was directed at unlawful conduct having nothing to do with books or
other expressive activity." Id. at 707.
435. Id. at 703 ("The [New York] Court of Appeals thus misread O'Brien,
which has no relevance to a statute directed at imposing sanctions on
nonexpressive activity.").
436. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 555-56, 503 N.E.2d at 493, 510 N.Y.S.2d at
845.
437. Id. at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
438. Id. The court of appeals had previously determined "that the closure
remedy fell within the constitutional power of the State; that the closure
remedy furthered a substantial state interest in thwarting prostitution; and that
the purpose of the closure remedy was unrelated to the suppression of speech."
Arcara, 478 U.S. at 701.
1996] 973
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than necessary to accomplish its purpose. ", 439 However, the court
of appeals found that other less intrusive sanctions might be
appropriate. 440 Such sanctions included arresting the offenders or
injunctive relief.441 If these sanctions are ineffective then the
state's burden would be met.442
Unlike Arcara, although the regulation in Dana was also aimed
at sexual conduct, the substantial public interest there was to
protect the public from the spread of AIDS rather than the mere
abatement of prostitution. 443 Furthermore, and more important to
this case from a technical legal standpoint, the court in Dana
concluded that because futile attempts had been made to halt the
illegal activity in the theater (such as the sending of warning
letters and the theater's failure to police itself), the state met its
burden of showing the means chosen were the least restrictive of
defendants' right to free expression. 444
It is worth restating that if Dana had been decided under the
Federal Constitution, the "least restrictive means" test set out in
O'Brien would have never applied. Under the Federal
Constitution, the O'Brien test only applies "when the
government's action was triggered by and directly aimed at
curtailing 'conduct that has an expressive element.' '445
However, Dana was able to invoke the "least restrictive means"
test because of the expansive protection of freedom of expression
provided under the State Constitution. More specifically, the state
constitution provides a broader definition of what may be
incidentally affected. As the court of appeals stated, the focus is
439. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 559, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 559, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
442. Id.
443. Dana, 165 Misc. 2d at 416, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 277. "[U]nlike Arcara,
the closing of the Cinema is motivated by the AIDS crisis [and] life and death
are at issue here." Id.
444. Id.
445. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 557, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846
(citations omitted). The New York Court of Appeals in Arcara explained that
the Supreme Court focused on the illegal sexual activity which is not
"expressive" and considered the effect on defendant's bookselling activities to
be too remote. Id.
974 [Vol 12
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 12 [2020], No. 3, Art. 33
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/33
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
on "the impact of the action on the protected activity and not the
nature of the activity which prompted the government to act."446
In summary, the court of appeals stated that the focus is not on
"who is aimed at but who is hit." 447
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